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Abstract 
Following a suggestion of Warren Weaver, we extend the Shannon model of communication 
piecemeal into a complex systems model in which communication is differentiated both 
vertically and horizontally. This model enables us to bridge the divide between Niklas 
Luhmann’s theory of the self-organization of meaning in communications and empirical research 
using information theory. First, we distinguish between communication relations and correlations 
among patterns of relations. The correlations span a vector space in which relations are 
positioned and can be provided with meaning. Second, positions provide reflexive perspectives. 
Whereas the different meanings are integrated locally, each instantiation opens global 
perspectives—“horizons of meaning”—along eigenvectors of the communication matrix. These 
next-order codifications of meaning can be expected to generate mutual redundancies when 
interacting in instantiations. Increases in redundancy indicate new options and can be measured 
as local reduction of prevailing uncertainty (in bits). The systemic generation of new options can 
be considered as a hallmark of the knowledge-based economy.  
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Introduction 
 
In his contribution to Shannon & Weaver’s (1949) The Mathematical Theory of Communication, 
Warren Weaver stated (at p. 27) that “[t]he concept of information developed in this theory at 
first seems disappointing and bizarre—disappointing because it has nothing to do with meaning 
…” However, the author added that Shannon’s analysis “has so penetratingly cleared the air that 
one is now, perhaps for the first time, ready for a real theory of meaning.” But how can one 
relate a theory of meaning to Shannon’s information theory (cf. Bar-Hillel & Carnap, 1953)? 
More recently, Niklas Luhmann ([1984] 1995) argued that meaning (“Sinn”) self-organizes in 
terms of communications among human beings. From this perspective meaning is generated in 
interactions among communications. As Luhmann (1996, at p. 261) formulated: “My argument 
is: it is not human beings who can communicate, rather, only communication can communicate.” 
However, Luhmann’s theory has remained far from operationalization and measurement.  
 
Following Bateson’s (1972, at p. 315) alternative definition of information as “a difference 
which makes a difference” (cf. MacKay, 1969), Luhmann (1984, pp. 102 ff.; 1995, pp. 67f.) 
considered information as implying a selection: a difference can only make a difference for a 
system of reference that selects this difference from among other possible differences. Others 
have also defined information with reference to a receiving system (e.g., an observer). Varela 
(1979, p. 266) even argued that since the word “information” is derived from “in-formare,” the 
semantics call for the specification of a system of reference to be informed. “Information,” 
however, is then considered a substantive concept that varies with the system of reference 
instead of a formal measure of the uncertainty prevailing in a distribution. Kauffman et al. (2008, 
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at p. 28), for example, defined information as “natural selection assembling the very constraints 
on the release of energy that then constitutes work and the propagation of organization.” In 
summary, using this alternative definition of information, the meaning of “information” becomes 
dependent on the theoretical context. Using the same word (“information”) for different concepts 
has led to considerable confusion in the literature.  
 
In an assessment of this confusion, Hayles (1990, pp. 59f.) compared the discussion with asking 
whether a glass is half empty or half full. As she noted, confusion can be avoided by using the 
words “uncertainty” or “probabilistic entropy” when Shannon-type information is meant. In our 
opinion, the advantage of measuring uncertainty—and redundancies, as we shall argue—in bits 
of information cannot be underestimated, since the operationalization and the measurement 
provide avenues to hypothesis testing and thus control of the theorizing (Theil, 1972). Note that 
uncertainty cannot be specified in terms of Bateson’s definition, but his “a difference which 
makes a difference” can be operationalized and measured in terms of (potentially negative) bits 
of information (Brillouin, 1962; von Foerster, 1960). 
 
Can Luhmann’s theory about interacting communications and the self-organization of meaning 
also be made compatible with Shannon’s information theory? Is it possible to specify how 
information and meaning are related? In this study, we aim to contribute to bridging this gap 
between a focus on meaning versus uncertainty processing by decomposing the problem using 
Herbert Simon’s (1973a) model of complex systems that are both vertically and horizontally 
differentiated, as follows:  
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1. In the vertical dimension, we follow Luhmann’s (e.g., 1975; 2000) distinction between (i) 
interactions among communications providing variation, (ii) the organization of meanings in 
historical instantiations, and (iii) the self-organization of reflexive meaning generating a next 
level of “horizons of meaning” as global systems of reference (Husserl, 1929; cf. Luhmann, 
1995b). Despite this inspiration from Luhmann, however, we also deviate from his 
framework, and argue that the construction in terms of layers is bottom-up from the 
(probabilistic) informational level; but the emerging system’s levels can be expected to take 
over control in terms of codified intentionalities and expectations. In other words, the 
operation in layers can also be described in terms of variation and selection mechanisms. 
 
For example, a scholarly communication (e.g., a manuscript) can be expected to contain a 
knowledge claim. Knowledge claims provide in this case the historical variation. When the 
manuscript is submitted, an editorial process is instantiated in which referee comments, 
editorial judgments, etc., are combined. The referees, however, are expected to judge the 
manuscript in terms according with the standards of the field invoking codes of the 
communication that can be expected to control the process. The instantiation requires a 
reflexive reorganization of the codes.  
 
Unlike Simon’s model (of complex and artificial systems), these next-order constructs—
codes of communication—can operate with frequencies much higher than the underlying 
practices. One can consider the constructs from two sides: the first being the constructing 
agency (in history), and the second being the resulting constructs themselves, which can only 
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be entertained reflexively (Giddens, 1979).
1
 Because of this reflexive status, the processing 
(e.g., sharing of meaning) is volatile and cannot be observed directly; but the operations can 
be specified. On the basis of this specification, one is able to identify and measure the 
“footprints” of the self-organizing dynamics in historical instantiations.  
 
In other words, intentions and intentional systems cannot be found as observables in res 
extensa—or “matter”—but can only be hypothesized reflexively in res cogitans—“thought” 
(Husserl, 1929; Luhmann, 1990). Entertaining such hypotheses can enrich our expectations 
by providing frames for inferences about observations. The consequent possibility of an 
inversion in the order of control from the material conditions to systems of expectations 
enables reflexive agents—human beings—to operate infra-reflexively across (vertical) levels 
and among (horizontal) compartments by changing their perspectives on the complexity 
(Latour, 1988; Pickering, 1995).  
 
2. In the horizontal direction, we follow Parsons’ (1968) proposal to consider the functional 
differentiation and symbolic generalization of the codes of communication as drivers of the 
increasing complexity in cultural evolution. Recalling another intuition of Herbert Simon 
(1973, at pp. 19 ff.), one can expect an alphabet of these codes; for example, power, love, 
truth, law, art, etc. Because of the various codes operating, the same communication can 
mean something quite different in terms of its affective value, its truth value, or how power is 
                                                 
1
 In Giddens’ structuration theory, these next-order structures are considered as rules and resources. From this 
perspective, structures exist only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated 
in action (Giddens, 1984, p. 177). Giddens (1979, pp.81 f.) formulates as follows: “The communication of meaning 
in interaction does not take place separately from the operation of relations of power, or outside the context of 
normative sanctions. (…) (P)ractices are situated within intersecting sets of rules and resources that ultimately 
express features of the totality.” 
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reproduced in communications (Parsons, 1963a and b; 1968; Künzler, 1987; Luhmann, 1974; 
1997). The complexity is increased because the codes are also recombined in their 
instantiations (Hoffmeyer & Emmeche, 1991). A dynamics of differentiation among the 
codes versus integration in instantiations is thus to be specified. Based on decoding and 
recoding, for example, differently codified expectations about markets and technologies can 
be recombined into new technological options (Arthur, 2009; Cowan & Foray, 1997). A 
technological evolution can thus be generated as a retention mechanism of the cultural 
evolution of possible expectations (Dubois, 2003).  
 
The generation of meaning from (Shannon-type) information 
 
How can the processing of meaning be conceptualized by elaborating on Shannon’s theory 
despite the author’s explicit statement that the “semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant 
to the engineering problem” (Shannon, 1948, at p. 3)? As a first step in the specification of the 
relevance of Shannon’s engineering model for developing a theory of meaning, Weaver (1949, at 
p. 26) proposed two “minor additions” to Shannon’s well-known diagram of a communication 
channel (Figure 1), as follows:  
 
“One can imagine, as an addition to the diagram, another box labeled “Semantic Receiver” 
interposed between the engineering receiver (which changes signals to messages) and the 
destination. This semantic receiver subjects the message to a second decoding, the demand 
on this one being that it must match the statistical semantic characteristics of the message to 
the statistical semantic capacities of the totality of receivers, or of that subset of receivers 
which constitute the audience one wishes to affect.  
Similarly one can imagine another box in the diagram which, inserted between the 
information source and the transmitter, would be labeled “semantic noise,” the box 
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previously labeled as simply “noise” now being labeled “engineering noise.” From this 
source is imposed into the signal the perturbations or distortions of meaning which are not 
intended by the source but which inescapably affect the destination. And the problem of 
semantic decoding must take this semantic noise into account.”  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Weaver’s (1949) “minor” additions penciled into Shannon’s (1948) original diagram. 
 
Since the “semantic receiver” recodes the information in the messages (received from the 
“engineering receiver” who only changes signals into messages) while having to assume the 
possibility of “semantic noise,” a semantic relationship between the two new boxes can also 
be envisaged. Given Shannon’s framework, however, this relation cannot be considered as 
another information transfer—since semantics are defined as external to Shannon’s 
engineering model.  
 
Semantics are not based on specific communications, but on relations among patterns of 
relations or, in other words, correlations. Two competing firms, for example, may have 
SEMANTIC 
NOISE 
SEMANTIC 
RECEIVER 
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highly correlating patterns of relations with clients, but no relation with each other (Burt, 
1982). The correlations among the distributions span a vector space in a topology different 
from the network space of relations (Appendix 1).
2
 Two synonyms, for example, can have 
the same position (and meaning) in the vector space, yet never co-occur in a single sentence 
as a relation. Meanings can be shared also without a direct relation. 
 
In the case of a single relation, the relational distance is not different from the correlational 
one; but in the case of relations involving three (or more) agents, the distances in the vector 
space are different from the Euclidean distances in the network space. Simmel (1902) 
already noted that the transition from a group of two to three is qualitative. In a triplet, the 
instantiation of one or the other relation can make a difference for the further development 
of the triadic system of relations.  
 
A system of relations can be considered as a semantic domain (Maturana, 1978). In other 
words, the sender and receiver are related in the graph of Figure 1, while they are correlated 
in terms of not necessarily instantiated relations in the background. The structure of 
correlations provides a latent background that provides meaning to the information 
exchanges in relations.
3
 The correlations are based on the same information, but the 
representation in the vector space is different from the graph in the network space of 
observable relations. In other words, meaning is not added to the information, but the same 
information is delineated differently and considered from a different perspective (including 
                                                 
2
 Each pattern of relations can be considered as a vector. When two vectors stand orthogonal in the vector space, the 
correlation is zero. See the Appendix for further explanation. 
3
 “Structures exist paradigmatically, as an absent set of differences, temporarily ‘present’ only in their instantiations, 
in the constituting moments of social systems.” (Giddens, 1979, p. 64). 
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absent relations; i.e., zeros in the distribution). As against Shannon-type information which 
flows linearly from the sender to the receiver, one can expect meanings to loop, and thereby, 
to develop next-order dimensionalities (Krippendorff, 2009a and b). 
 
The third and fourth dimensions of the probabilistic entropy 
 
A matrix of communications is shaped when one adds a second dimension (of codes) to the 
single vector of communication in Figure 1. A matrix can also be considered as a two-
dimensional probability distribution—different from the one-dimensional probability 
distribution in a vector. When the communication matrix—of information processing and 
meaning processing—is repeated over time, one obtains a three-dimensional array because 
time is added as a third dimension (Figure 2a). In such a three-dimensional array, the 
development of information can also be considered in terms of trajectories; the uncertainty 
is then organized historically (over time). A four-dimensional array or hyper-cube of 
information is more difficult to imagine or represent graphically: unlike a (three-
dimensional) trajectory, a four-dimensional array can contain a next-order regime that feeds 
back on its historical development along trajectories (Dosi, 1982).  
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t = t 
t – tn 
t – tm 
 
 
Figure 2a (left) and 2b (right): A three-dimensional array of information can contain a trajectory; a four-dimensional hypercube 
contains one more degree of freedom and thus a variety of possible trajectories. Source: Leydesdorff (1996), p. 289. 
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One can consider the next-order regime as having one more degree of freedom that allows it 
to select among the possible trajectories in three dimensions as representations of its past 
(Figure 2b). This additional selection implies a reflection by the system. The reflection is 
performative in the present and can therefore be considered as the self-organization of an 
adaptive system. In the four-dimensional system, one representation of its history in three 
dimensions can be acknowledged (weighted) more than another.  
 
We can consider ourselves as psychologies with the reflexive capacity to reconstruct the 
possible representations of our history. Luhmann (e.g., 1986a) suggested modeling the 
social system of communications as a system without psychological consciousness, but with 
an equal level of complexity. Whereas a psychological system is centered on the individuum 
and will therefore tend to integration (Haken & Portugali, 2014), the communication system 
is distributed (as a “dividuum” ; Luhmann, 1984: 625; cf. Nietzsche, [1878] 1967: 76) and 
has the option of exploiting the additional degree of freedom for differentiation. Different 
from a high culture, the modern society is based on prevailing differentiation among codes 
of communication, so that a set of juxtaposed coordination mechanisms can be used. The 
different coordination mechanisms are partially integrated when the systems are instantiated 
in terms of historical organization and action. 
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In terms of evolution theory, the coordination mechanisms (e.g., the market) can also be 
considered as selection mechanisms which operate with different criteria. The recursion of 
selection at the structural level leads to second-order variation: selections can be selected for 
stabilization (in history), and some stabilizations can be selected for globalization (at the 
regime level). For subsequent selections, however, the historical origin of a variation is not 
always relevant. Thus, the system of expectations may continuously loop into itself at 
different levels and from different perspectives.  
 
Levels B and C in the Shannon diagram 
 
Weaver (1949, p. 24) suggested taking Shannon’s original diagram as a representation of 
“level A” which can be complemented with more levels (B and C) that represent how 
meaning is conveyed at level B, and how and why the received meaning can affect behavior 
(at level C)? Elaborating on Shannon’s model and Weaver’s addition as depicted in Figure 
1, we propose Figure 3 as a scheme for levels B and C. 
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Figure 3: Levels B and C added to the Shannon diagram (in red-brown and dark-blue, 
respectively). 
 
We specified above that the relation between the semantic receiver and semantic noise is based 
on correlations among sets of relations at level A. In the vector space (level B), meanings can be 
shared, but not communicated (because otherwise one operates at level A). The use of language 
facilitates, supports, and potentially reinforces the options for sharing meaning. Natural 
languages (at level B), however, can be considered as the as yet undifferentiated and therefore 
common medium of communication. Codes of communication are used at the symbolic level C 
 Translations and 
Reconstructions 
SEMANTIC 
NOISE 
SEMANTIC 
RECEIVER 
CORRELATIONS; 
LANGUAGE 
Generalized Code of 
Communication II 
Generalized Code of 
Communication I 
14 
for regulating the use of language. The codes enable us, among other things,
7
  to short cut the 
communication; for example, by paying the market price of a good instead of negotiating this 
price using language. In our opinion, the codes of communication are thus candidates for 
Weaver’s level C: the codes and their combinations enable us to make the communications far 
more precise and efficient than is possible in natural languages.   
 
Talcott Parsons (1968, p. 440) provided a sociological appreciation of the operations at level C 
as follows:  
 
“At the cultural level [language] is clearly the fundamental matrix of the whole system of 
media. Large-scale social systems, however, contain more specialized media (if you will, 
specialized “languages”), such as money, power, and influence (see Parsons 1963a; 1963b). 
Such media, like language, control behavior in the processes of interaction.” 
 
In addition to symbolic, Parsons (1963a and b; 1968) characterized these media as “generalized” 
with a reference to Mead’s (19324: pp. 154 ff.) “generalized other.” Luhmann (1974) further 
argued that “symbolically generalized media of communication” would have to be binary—like 
true and false in logics—in order to be binding (Luhmann, 1984: 316f.; 1995: 233f.; cf. Künzler, 
1987: 329 ff.). In our opinion, they can be more complex than one-dimensional and binary (cf. 
Hoffmeyer & Emmeche, 1991). For example, Herbert Simon (1973b) argued in favor of truth-
finding and puzzle-solving as combined “logics” in scientific discovery. However, this 
operationalization has also remained chiefly a philosophical appreciation of the evolutionary 
                                                 
7
 Spelling rules, syntax, and pragmatics can also be considered as codes in the use of language, but we focus on the 
semantics. 
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process (cf. Popper, 1959 [1935]) more than a proposal for empirical operationalization (cf. 
Newell & Simon, 1972).  
 
In our opinion, the sciences evolve as systems of expectations rationalized by arguments in 
discourses; after a further development, the criteria may also have changed (Fujigaki, 1998; 
Kuhn, 1962). Using the conceptualization of the codes as the latent dimensions (principal 
components or “eigenvectors”;8 von Foerster, 1960; cf. von Glasersfeld, 2008, at p. 64, 4n.) of 
the communication matrix, one can appreciate the uncertain and evolving character of these 
codes of communications. From this perspective, the designation of these structures remains a 
historical appreciation. 
 
For example, in the case of the science system, Luhmann (1990) argued for true/not-true as the 
code that provides a binary criterion for quality control in scholarly discourse. However, in the 
empirical sciences, the truth of statements is not unambiguous: some statements can be more true 
or less false than others. Since the sciences develop as discursive knowledge, uncertainty is 
always present. In a study of the debates about oxidative phosphorylation—which led to the 
Nobel Price of Chemistry for Peter Mitchell in 1978—Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) found that 
statements were relabeled using different repertoires when they were considered true or 
erroneous from the perspective of hindsight. 
 
                                                 
8
 Using linear algebra: for any function f, if a and λ exist such that f(a) = λf(a), then a is called the eigenvector and λ 
the eigenvalue (Achterbergh & Vriens, 2009, p. 84n.). In the case of a communication matrix W, WA = λ A with A 
as eigenvector and  λ  as eigenvalue. Eigenvectors can also be considered as pointing to densities consequential to 
the recursive operations of self-organizing systems (von Foerster, 1960, 1982).   
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Codes can also be nested. For example, different specialties may operate with different codes 
while sharing some general criteria for the quality control of scholarly communications. 
Similarly, in economic transactions, a variety of payment methods can be distinguished under the 
umbrella of an economic logic that differs from a scholarly or normative one (Boudon, 1979; 
Bourdieu, 1976).  
 
In his last book, Pierre Bourdieu (2004, at p. 83) precisely formulated a reflection on the 
empirical study of the sciences, as follows:  
 
Each field (discipline) is the site of a specific legality (a nomos), a product of history, which 
is embodied in the objective regularities of the functioning of the field and, more precisely, 
in the mechanisms governing the circulation of information, in the logic of the allocation of 
rewards, etc., and in the scientific habitus produced by the field, which are the condition of 
the functioning of the field. […]  
What are called epistemic criteria are the formalization of the ‘rules of the game’ 
that have to be observed in the field, that is, of the sociological rules of interactions within 
the field, in particular, rules of argumentation or norms of communication. Argumentation is 
a collective process performed before an audience and subject to rules.  
 
Bourdieu (at p. 78) calls this a “Kantian”—that is, transcendental—transition from “objectivity” 
to “intersubjectivity” as the carrying ground of scientific inferences. However, the philosopher 
most associated with this transition is Edmund Husserl, who criticized the increasingly empiristic 
self-understanding of the modern (European) sciences (Husserl, [1935/36] 1962). According to 
Husserl ([1929] 1960, at p. 155), the possibility to communicate expectations intersubjectively 
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grounds the empirical sciences “in a concrete theory of science”. One tests expectations 
entertained at the supra-individual level (in discourses) against observations, and the 
observations can update the expectations since they can function as arguments.  
 
We shall take from Husserl that the self-organizing codes of the communication at level C are 
not material, but belong to our reality as structures of expectations or res cogitans. Popper (1972) 
denoted this domain as World 3, but neither he nor Husserl specified the evolutionary dynamics 
of expectations in terms of communications (Luhmann, 1986b). We submit that res cogitans can 
be expected to develop in terms of redundancies instead of probabilistic entropy, unlike the 
material world (res extensa) where the Second Law prevails. Language and the symbolic media 
of communication enable us to multiply meanings as options at a speed much faster than can 
historically be realized. The codes of communications provide us with horizons of other possible 
meanings. The different codes can be recombined and reconstructed in translations among 
differently coded meanings. We shall argue that at level B, meanings are instantiated in specific 
combinations of codes, while at level C the codes themselves evolve in response to the historical 
integrations in the instantiations. 
 
The transformation of hitherto “impossible” options into technological feasible ones 
 
Whereas historical developments unfold with the arrow of time—and are necessarily related to 
the generation of entropy—expectations enable us to use possible future states in the present, i.e.,  
against the arrow of time. The dynamics of expectations therefore are very different from 
organizational dynamics. Under specifiable conditions, the interactions among differently coded 
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expectations can generate redundancy (that is, negative entropy). Redundancy enriches a system 
with new options that are available for realization. 
 
The redundancy R is defined in information theory as the fraction of the capacity of a 
communication channel that is not used. In formula format:  
 
max
max
max
1
H
HH
H
H
R



 (1) 
 
As is well-known, Shannon’s (1948) probabilistic entropy (H) is coupled to Gibbs’ formula for 
thermodynamic entropy HkS B * . In Gibbs’ equation, kB is the Boltzmann constant that 
provides the dimensionality Joule/Kelvin to S, while H is dimensionless and can be measured in 
bits of information (or any other base of the logarithm) given a probability distribution 
(containing uncertainty). The Second Law of thermodynamics states that entropy increases with 
each operation, and Shannon-type information is accordingly always positive. 
 
Brooks & Wiley (1986) noted that in the case of an evolving (e.g., biological) system, not only 
the observed (probabilistic) entropy (Hobs) of the system increases, but also the maximum 
entropy (Hmax = ln N)—that is the system’s capacity— increases as the total number of possible 
options (states) N also increases. The difference between the maximum entropy and the realized 
entropy is provided by the options that are available, but have not yet been used. From the 
perspective of information theory, these surplus options are redundant. Using Brooks & Wiley’s 
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(1986, at p. 43) illustration in Figure 4a, we added green to the redundancy as part of the 
evolving entropy. Redundancy provides a measure of the options that were not realized by the 
system, but could have been realized. Kauffman (2000), for example, calls these possible 
realizations “adjacent.”  
  
  
Figure 4a: The development of entropy (Hobs), 
maximum entropy (Hmax), and redundancy 
(Hmax – Hobs). Source: Brooks & Wiley (1986, 
at p. 43). 
Figure 4b: Hitherto impossible options 
are made possible because of cultural 
and technological evolution. 
 
Above the green area, Brooks & Wiley (1986, at p. 43) added the label “impossible” as a legend 
(see Figure 4a). In Figure 4b, we have added the domain “technologically made feasible” to this 
latter area in order to introduce how the generation of new options (and hence increased 
redundancy) can be enhanced by a model of cultural evolution which includes the levels B and 
C. An intentional system operates by adding new options (redundancy) without necessarily 
realizing them (as probabilistic entropy).  
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The codes regulate the generation of redundancies at interfaces from above, whereas Shannon 
entropy is continuously generated in the historical process from below. The latter process is 
linear, whereas expectations can circulate before being organized in realizations. Redundancy is 
generated when two (or more) perspectives on the same information are operating at an interface, 
as in the case of introducing a new technology in a market or when writing a report based on 
scholarly arguments for a government agency. In such cases, one needs text that can be read 
using the various codes involved  (Fujigaki & Leydesdorff, 2000). The redundancy observable in 
the green surfaces of Figure 4b is generated by the recombination of sufficiently different 
expectations. Let us try to specify this process in information-theoretical terms. 
 
a. Mutual redundancy between two differently coded systems 
 
In Figure 5, the overlap between uncertainties in two variables x1 and x2 is depicted as two sets. 
The mutual information or transmission (T12) is then defined as follows:  
 
122112 HHHT   (2) 
 
 
1 2 12
2 
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Figure 5: Overlapping uncertainties in two variables x1 and x2. 
 
Note that the addition of entropies accords with the rules of set theory. Alternatively, one can 
consider the overlap as a redundancy: the same information is appreciated twice. In addition to 
H1 and H2, the overlap contains redundancy as a surplus of information, as follows: 
 
𝑌12 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝑇12 =  𝐻12 + 2𝑇12 (3) 
  
The mutual redundancy R12 at the interface between the two sets can now be found by using Y12 
instead of H12 in Eq. 2, as follows:  
 
𝑅12 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 − 𝛶12  
        = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 − (𝐻12 + 2𝑇12) 
=  𝐻1 + 𝐻2 − ([𝐻1 +  𝐻2 − 𝑇12] + 2𝑇12) 
= −𝑇12 (4) 
 
Since T12 is necessarily positive (Shannon, 1948, p. 53), it follows from Eq. 4 that R12 is always 
negative and therefore by definition a redundancy. This reduction of the uncertainty can be 
measured in bits of information with a negative sign. In other words, this redundancy cannot be a 
Shannon-type information, since the latter information is necessarily positive (Krippendorff, 
2009a). Using mutual redundancy, one no longer measures a historical process—generating 
uncertainty—but a process in the realm of expectations: future states are represented in the 
present (Dubois, 1998). 
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b. Redundancy in three and four dimensions 
 
For the three-dimensional case and using Figure 6, one can define, in addition to the two-
dimensional values of Υ (in Eq. 3), a three-dimensional value including the redundancies (in the 
respective overlaps) as follows: 
 
𝛶123 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝐻3 + 𝑇12 + 𝑇13 + 𝑇23 + 𝑇123 (5)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Overlapping uncertainties in three variables x1, x2, and x3:  
two configurations with opposite sign of T123. 
 
 
Using information theory, however, one would make the following corrections for double 
counting in the overlaps (by subtracting; see Figure 6): 
 
 
1 2 
3 
T123 
 
1 
2 
3 
23 
𝐻123 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝐻3 − 𝑇12 − 𝑇13 − 𝑇23 + 𝑇123 (6) 
 
It follows that the difference between the uncertainty in the historical system (H123 in Eq. 6) and 
the system of expectations (𝛶123 in Eq. 5) is:  
 
𝛶123 −  𝐻123 = +2𝑇12 + 2𝑇13 + 2𝑇23 
𝛶123 = 𝐻123 + 2𝑇12 + 2𝑇13 + 2𝑇23  (7) 
 
Furthermore, the mutual information in three dimensions can be derived in information theory 
using the Shannon formulas (e.g., Abramson, 1963, at p. 129; McGill, 1954; Yeung, 2008) as:  
 
𝑇123 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝐻3 − 𝐻12 − 𝐻13 − 𝐻23 + 𝐻123 (8) 
 
Using Υ-values instead of H-values for the joint entropies in Eq. 8, one obtains the mutual 
redundancy in three dimensions as follows:  
 
𝑅123 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝐻3 − (𝐻12 + 2𝑇12) − (𝐻13 + 2𝑇13) − (𝐻23 + 2𝑇23) 
+ (𝐻123 + 2𝑇12 + 2𝑇13 + 2𝑇23) 
= 𝑇123 (9) 
 
In the three-dimensional case, the mutual redundancy is thus equal to the mutual information in 
three dimensions. Furthermore, Leydesdorff & Ivanova (2014, at p. 392) show that in the case of 
four dimensions R1234 = – T1234. The sign of the mutual redundancy alternates with the number of 
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dimensions. This corrects for the otherwise inexplicable sign changes in the mutual information 
with increasing dimensionality. This sign change of the mutual information with dimensions is a 
well-known problem in information theory, but beyond the scope of the present study.
9
 In other 
words, mutual redundancy is a consistent measure of negative entropy, while mutual information  
is not, because of its sign changes with the dimensionality. We prove this claim in the next 
section by generalizing the formulation. 
 
c. Generalization 
 
Eq. 8 can be rewritten as follows:  
 
T123 = H1 + H2 + H3 - H12 - H13 - H23 + H123 (8) 
T123 = [(H1 + H2 - H12) + (H1 + H3 - H13) + (H2 + H3 – H23)] + [H123 - H1 - H2 - H3]  
T123 = [T12 + T13 + T23] + [H123 - H1 - H2 - H3] (10) 
 
The second bracket in Eq. 10 makes a negative contribution, because of the subadditivity of the 
entropy: 𝐻(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)  ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛
1 ), which holds for any dimension n≥ 2. The terms in the first 
bracket of Eq. 10 are strictly positive.  As noted, the sign of the resulting value of T123 depends 
on the empirical configuration (as indicated by the two configurations in Figure 6). 
 
                                                 
9
 Krippendorff (2009b, at p. 670) provided a general notation for this alteration with changing dimensionality—but 
with the opposite sign (which further complicate the issue; cf. Leydesdorff, 2010: 68)—as follows: 
 
𝑄(Γ) = ∑ (−1)1+ |Γ|−|𝑋|𝐻(𝑋)𝑋⊆Γ  (9) 
 
In this equation, Γ is the set of variables of which X is a subset, and H(X) is the uncertainty of the distribution; |Γ| is 
the cardinality of Γ, and |X| the cardinality of X. 
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It follows (inductively) that for any given dimension n, one can formulate combinations of 
mutual informations corresponding to ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛
1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) that are by definition positive 
(or zero in the null case of complete independence). For example (up to four dimensions) as 
follows: 
 
0 ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛=2
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, 𝑥2) =  𝑇12  
0 ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛=3
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3) =  ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗
3
𝑖𝑗 − 𝑇123 (11) 
0 ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛=4
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4) = ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗
6
𝑖𝑗 −  ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘
4
𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝑇1234  
 
where the sums on the right-hand side are over the (𝑛
𝑘
) permutations of the indices. This relation 
can be extended for general n as, 
 
0 ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)   
     = ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗
(𝑛2)
𝑖𝑗 − ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘
(𝑛3)
𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 − ⋯ + (−1)
1+𝑛 (
𝑛
4)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙…(𝑛−1)
( 𝑛𝑛−1)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙…(𝑛−1)
+
          (−1)𝑛 ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙...(𝑛)
(𝑛𝑛)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙…(𝑛)
 (12) 
  
where the last term on the right-hand side is equal to (−1)𝑛 𝑇1234...𝑛. Returning to the relation 
between 𝑅12 and 𝑇12, it now follows instructively that:  
 
𝑅12 = − 𝑇12 
 = 𝐻(𝑥1, 𝑥2) − ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
2
1 ) ≤ 0  (13) 
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and the analogous relations for 𝑅123 and 𝑅1234 follow in the same way from Eq. (12). More 
generally, in the case of more than two dimension, n > 2: 
 
𝑅𝑛 = (−1)
1+𝑛 𝑇1234…𝑛 = [𝐻(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) − ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛
1 )]  
     +[∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗
(𝑛2)
𝑖𝑗 −  ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘
(𝑛3)
𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 − ⋯ + (−1)
1+𝑛 (
𝑛
4)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙...(𝑛−1)
( 𝑛𝑛−1)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙…(𝑛−1)
] (14) 
 
The left-bracketed term of Eq. 14 is necessarily negative entropy (because of the subadditivity of 
the entropy), while the configuration of the remaining mutual information relations contribute a 
second term on the right which is positive (see the set of Equations 11 above). In other words, we 
model here the generation of redundancy on the one side versus the historical process of 
uncertainty generation in relating on the other, as an empirical balance in a system that operates 
with more than two codes (e.g., alphabets; Abramson, 1963, pp. 127 ff.). When the resulting R is 
negative, self-organization prevails over organization in the configuration under study, whereas a 
positive R indicates conversely a predominance of organization over self-organization as two 
different subdynamics.  
 
d. Clockwise and anti-clockwise rotations 
 
As soon as the relation between two subdynamics (or agents) is extended with a third, the third 
may feedback or feed-forward on the communication relation between the two, and thus a 
system is shaped (Sun & Negishi, 2010). This principle is known in social network analysis as 
“triadic closure” (Bianconi et al., 2014; De Nooy & Leydesdorff, 2015). Triadic closure can be 
considered as the basic mechanism of systems formation. When three selection environments 
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operate on variation in the interactions among them, the communication can proliferate auto-
catalytically using each third mechanism as a feedback on or feed-forward to bi-lateral relations. 
At a next moment, the cycling may take control as a vortex (Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014b). 
 
Ulanowicz (2009 at p. 1888) depicted this possibility of auto-catalysis as follows:  
 
 
Figure 7: Schematic of a hypothetical three-component autocatalytic cycle.  
(Source: Ulanowicz, 2009, at p. 1888, Figure 3.)  
 
 
A second cycle with the reverse order of the operations is equally possible; the two cycles can be 
modeled as two vectors with three dimensions (A, B, and C), and this system can then be 
simulated in terms of rotations of the vectors. One vector can be understood as corresponding to 
the tendency of historical realization and the other to self-organization. Using simulations, 
Ivanova & Leydesdorff (2014a) showed that the operation of these two three-dimensional 
vectors upon each other generates a value of R depending on the configuration. As we showed 
above, R can also be measured.  
 
The one sign of R can be associated with clockwise and the other with anti-clockwise rotation, 
whereas the values of the two terms in Eq. 14 measure the relative weights of the two rotations. 
In other words, mutual redundancy indicates the size of the footprint of the self-organizing fluxes 
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of communication on the historical organization in the instantiation. The cycles can be vicious or 
virtuous in the sense of providing opportunities or exploiting existing ones.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
We have extended Shannon’s model of communication (at level A) with two levels (B and C) 
that change the linear model into an evolutionary one because feedback and feed-forward loops 
are possible among the levels. At level A, information is transmitted; at level B, information is 
organized and thus made meaningful in a vector-space. Reflexivity reveals that this vector space 
is constructed and therefore a potential subject of reconstruction: the possibility of reconstruction 
opens horizons of meaning (level C). These horizons can be expected to evolve along the 
eigenvectors of the communication matrix in different directions. Whereas the common language 
at level B tends to integration (into organization), horizontal differentiation among the codes at 
level C increases the communication capacity of the system. 
 
Codes of communication are no longer actor-attributes, but operate on the communications 
among human beings reflexively—that is, by co-constructing the meaning of the communication 
(Luhmann, 1984). In other theoretical contexts, one can also consider the codes as virtual 
coordination mechanisms (e.g., Giddens’ structuration theory) or as selection mechanisms (e.g., 
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1982). As Andersen (1992, p. 14) noted specification of “What is 
evolving?” becomes a relevant question when selection is no longer given by nature (cf. 
Boulding, 1978, p. 33). The question arises, under which conditions can the different selection 
mechanisms be expected to co-evolve and lead to new options for realizing innovations?  
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We showed that redundancies can be generated at interfaces among systems as sets of relations 
which are structured by codes, whereas in historical relations (instantiations) only variety is 
generated. Biological evolution theory assumes variation as a driver and selection to be naturally 
given, while cultural evolution is driven by individuals and groups who make conscious 
decisions on the basis of potentially different criteria (Newell & Simon, 1972; Petersen et al., 
2016).  
 
Note that the interactions among the codes in the instantiations generate the redundancies. In 
Luhmann’s theory, these interactions are held to be impossible: the binary codes close the 
autopoiesis of systems and subsystems operationally. Whereas biological systems gain in 
complexity by closing themselves operationally, systems of expectations can disturb one another 
“infra-reflexively” (Latour, 1988, at pp. 169 ff.). Cultural evolution can therefore be much faster 
than biological evolution. The “avoidance of redundancy” is an objective in Luhmann’s model of 
autopoiesis and functional differentiation (e.g., 2013, p. 98), whereas redundancy generation is 
considered crucial for the advancement of society in our model. Redundancy provides new 
options for technological development that are not yet realized, but can be envisaged. 
 
In addition to vertical differentiation, the assumption of horizontal differentiation is needed for 
understanding the evolving complexity. The differentiation and the ensuing pluriformity of the 
competing coordination mechanisms break the structural formations of autopoietic systems so 
that the established meanings can be interrupted by other possible meanings. The generation of 
redundancy can thus enter the historical instantiations, and under the condition of self-
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reinforcing loops, can thereby tip the balance towards the prevalence of evolutionary self-
organization over historical organization. We have shown how the trade-off between historical 
organization and self-organization over time can be traced by the measurement of mutual 
redundancies. 
 
When three or more selection mechanisms operate, auto-catalysis is an option, and options can 
then be generated at an increasing pace. Thus, horizontal differentiation is a necessary 
component of self-organization in the vertical dimension. The warp and the woof of meaning 
generation and self-organization are not harmoniously integrated as in textiles, but differentiated 
and disturbing one another. The layers are not hierarchical, but operating in parallel. These 
horizontal and vertical dynamics lead to a fractal manifold in different directions. Through 
breakages (and hence puzzles) new options can be generated.  
 
The generation of redundancy proceeds in a domain of expectations about options that do not 
(yet) exist, but that one can reflexively entertain. By turning away from an objectivistic self-
understanding of the sciences, we find room for a general theory of meaning and knowledge-
generation that we have depicted as an extension of Shannon’s theory (Figure 3). Whereas 
Shannon felt the need to explicitly deny this extension, Weaver understood it as the theory’s 
proper intension.  
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Appendix 1 
 
As an example of a set of relations which can be formalized within a coordinate system (vector 
space) defined by relations, consider two agents or firms A and B with similar relations to 
agents/clients [C1, C2, C3], but no relations between them. In the case of a Triple-Helix 
configuration, C1, C2, and C3 can be a university, another firm, and the government, 
respectively. A and B can be represented as two vectors constructed as follows: 
 
 A B C1 C2 C3 
Firm A 1 0 1 0 1 
Firm B 0 1 1 0 1 
 
 
The Pearson correlation between these two distributions is r = 0.167 (n.s.). A natural measure of 
similarity between vectors is the cosine of the angle between them; in this case, cos(A,B) = 
0.667. Figure A1 represents the relations in a three-dimensional Euclidean space of, for example, 
University-Industry-Government relations. 
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 C1 
C3 
C2 
A 
B 
cos(A,B) = 0.67 
Figure A1: The two distributions as vectors in a three-dimensional (“Triple Helix”) space. 
Source: Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014, p. 930. 
   
Using the vectors themselves as non-orthogonal axes, one can span a vector space (Salton & 
McGill, 1983, pp. 120 ff.; Figure A2).  
 
Figure A2: Vector space in the case of three vectors. 
 
The vector space can be multi-dimensional; the dimensionality is determined by the number of 
vectors. Eigenvectors can be considered as vectors pointing to the centroids of clusters in a space 
37 
reducing the dimensionality of the vector space (using, e.g., factor analysis or multi-dimensional 
scaling; Schiffman et al., 1981). See also footnote 8 above. 
 
